Boko Haram and President Buhari

For some time now, there has been a persistent buzzing in my ears. First, I thought it was bathing attempts gone awry. A closer observation showed it occurs at particular occasions, especially when I hear ‘the Presidency’, ‘negotiate’ and ‘Boko Haram’ in the same sentence.
I have refrained from commenting on the Presidency’s resolve to negotiate with Boko Haram for so long. I did that specifically to know if there are some aspects of this strategic move I have missed; as change is the only fixed dynamic in our existence. Probably, there are fresh policy thrusts among international actors on the global stage unbeknown to us to justify the move.
No more. An event occurred that mandated that the buzzing nearly splintered my ears a few days ago. I just have to speak before forever holding my silence on this matter. This come-to-Jesus moment surfaced when the news filtered in that Abubakar Shekau is still alive and remains the head of Boko Haram weeks after Chadian authorities exultantly exclaimed that their troops had captured and killed him. The drummer in my ears furiously went rum-adum-dum-dum once more.
That development pierces dead in the centre the weakness in government’s plans to negotiate with the bloodthirsty group. It is totally unknown who the government wants to negotiate with. Boko Haram assiduously borrowed a leaf from Al-Qaeda’s book of impersonation and it is nearly impossible to verify the authenticity of its leaders as they amorphously blend into one another. Shekau has been widely reportedly killed in the last two years, four times. The Chadian authorities joined the fray recently in stating they had killed the bearded man of Boko Haram. Claims and counter claims have been made that Shekau was killed long ago and the ones masquerading nowadays are alter egos. Or, is it? We do not know for certain. Is there a sample of the original Shekau’s DNA? Can his family members be got for such tests? We know what is Boko Haram. Do we know who is Boko Haram? Who are the members of its Shura Council, its senior executive management team, who would appoint members of such negotiating team? And how is government going to verify the authenticity of all these to avoid dealing with impostors? By the next presidential election, answers to these posers are highly likely to remain elusive.
And, hypothetically now, why would any person want to negotiate with an armed robber who kills his children and robs his household blind? There is non-absolute definition of terrorism by all global bodies. But, most agree such groups’ similarities lie in their unlawful intentions to undermine the sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial integrity of lawfully-constituted governments and nations to advance their cause through unleashing atmospheres of fear. Its principal intention of undermining lawful governments is principally why nations do not negotiate with them. It is anomalous for a corporate entity to conduct business with an illegal company which aims primarily to destroy its existence.
Supporters of negotiations with Boko Haram quickly point at governments who are touted as having negotiated with terrorists. Like Britain and the Irish Republican Army. Like America and the release of Sgt. Robert Bergdal.
Even while doing this, they tread a fine line of doing so to basically secure the release of their nationals during hostage negotiations. Gilad Shalit, an Israeli prisoner of war released in a 2011 exchange for 1, 027 Palestinian prisoners.
Ronald Reagan sanctioned the Iran-Contra deal Taliban-aligned Haqqani Network; Robert Bergdal’s captors did not threaten the territorial integrity of United States. Otherwise, that exchange for his release would never have happened. The release of five captors for Bergdal’s release ties in with America’s foreign policy for securing, unhurt, the life of a single American held anywhere in the world. Now, Aafia Siddiue is a female terrorist that Al-Qaeda has been demanding her release from US for a long time; it is even one of its cardinal cries to arms, but, US never even dignified the demand with a comment. Bergdal’s captors did not threaten the territorial integrity of United States. Al-Qaeda did. And still does. There is a big difference.
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta slyly exploited this fact to its advantage. It termed its intentions a struggle not terrorism; it ensured minimal human casualties and deliberately mismatches calls for autonomy with demands for semi-autonomy over its region’s resources. It carefully did not declare secession, print its currency or design its flag which as symbols of statehood, which would have attracted greater opprobrium indeed. Besides, their leaders were easily identifiable. So, the amnesty deal offered to them was a success. Besides, the government dictated what it wanted to be done even with that process. It did not negotiate.
It is the reverse with Boko Haram. It is busy overrunning parts of territories constituting legal parts of Nigeria, burning the Nigeria flag and hoisting its instead and has vowed to effect a government change with Boko Haram’s interpretation of Islam. Equally blood-feeding Islamic State is its United Nations as it has pledged its allegiance to it. And it is frequently bellowing threats to the Nigerian nation in its infamous demand for a religious state.
With IRA, the British government conducted the situation like war-surrender first. It demanded the total surrender and non-engagement of IRA in violence before starting a peace process with it. Is that the process the Nigerian government is toeing with Boko Haram? There was a time the Goodluck Jonathan administration announced a ceasefire with Boko Haram and we all witnessed how fickle that was even though the same can be said of that particular administration in tackling Boko Haram.
Regardless of government’s predilection of affirming the secrecy of the details of this process, its deliberate public revelation of its intention to negotiate with Boko Haram necessitates an open revelation of these. But, a participant in the process has averred that the rules of engagements of this supposed negotiation have remained sketchy. For effective negotiations, the demands of both sides have to be known, discussed and a common agreement that is suitable to all sides must be reached. We do not know that of the Federal Government besides cessation of killings but Boko Haram in the past wants the arrest and punishment of security officers involved in the police’s alleged extrajudicial killing of Muhammed Yusuf, its founder; compensation to his family and families of those killed in the 2009 military assault on Boko Haram. However, it is unclear if that remains Boko Haram’s demands for negotiation.
Nigerian authorities could aver that these concerns would be raised after Boko Haram agrees to negotiate. Such would be hardly beneficial as government would be responding to Boko Haram’s positions, bargaining from a weak perspective rather than otherwise as noted above with Britain and IRA.
Above all, the overriding dictum here is total discretion. There is no absolutism in how international actors behave in executing actions of guaranteeing the sovereignty of their domains. In such situations, it always done away from the klieg lights and with no prior announcement, and of course, no records.

by Modupe Ogunbayo, in The Punch